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Introduction 
 
Cohesive political parties facilitate democratic representation for a number of 
reasons. Decision-making in legislatures with cohesive parties is more 
structured and less prone to voting cycles (Aldrich 1995: chapter 2). Cohesive 
parties also structure electoral choice for voters and provide a mechanism 
through which citizens’ preferences are transformed into public policy 
(Thomassen 1994). Political parties can be cohesive either because there is 
internal agreement or because the party enforces discipline. Internal 
agreement is arguably more important, as ‘below some minimal level of 
coherence, it is impossible, at least within the confines of democratic politics, 
to impose discipline’ (Bowler et al. 1999: 5).  Both paths to party cohesion 
have been studied extensively (e.g. Norpoth 1976; Cox and McCubbins 1993; 
Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Bowler et al. 1999; Cameron 2000).  
Territorial or regional divisions are a significant source of disunity within 
political parties. Parties in federal systems are often organised at the level of 
subnational units, and internal divisions can surface within parties along these 
lines (Carey 2007: 94-5). For example, state-level party organisations play a 
key role in terms of candidate selection and campaigning in Brazil, reducing 
cohesion in parties at the federal level both in the upper house, which is 
designed to represent state interests, and in the lower house (Desposato 
2004: 271-2). Cooperative federalism, where state governments are 
represented in the upper house, may exacerbate internal party divisions, 
since ‘the two levels of party organisation come into direct competition in the 
central legislative process’ (Hix 1998: 30).  
Such territorial divisions present a significant potential obstacle to the 
cohesion of party groups in the European Parliament (EP). Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) serve both national parties and transnational 
party groups to some extent, since each has a prominent role in their political 
careers. EP party groups are amalgamations of national parties, which remain 
the primary organisational units at elections. National parties select 
candidates for EP elections, provide campaign support, and are the primary 
object of vote choice for voters. National parties are also relevant to MEPs’ 
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careers after they leave the EP, because MEPs frequently return to national 
politics after leaving the EP. National governments are also at the centre of 
the EU’s legislative process, which gives them the possibility of monitoring 
and pressuring MEPs. Nearly all EU legislation must be approved by both the 
EP and the Council of Ministers, the latter of which consists of representatives 
of member-state governments. The EU legislative system is therefore 
bicameral, with a structure that is in some ways comparable to cooperative 
federalist systems such as Germany (Börzel and Hosli 2003).  
The cohesion of transnational party groups in the EP has been studied 
using two main approaches. The first is roll-call votes (e.g. Attinà 1990; 
Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Kreppel 2002; Hix et al. 2007). Approximately 
one-third of all votes taken in the EP are roll-call votes, which means that the 
voting behaviour of each MEP is recorded. The headline finding from the 
analysis of roll-call votes is that cohesion is relatively high. On the whole, 
MEPs vote similarly to MEPs in the same party group. To the extent that party 
groups differ from each other, they differ on the socioeconomic Left-Right 
dimension. Moreover, party group loyalty appears to be stronger than national 
loyalty, in that MEPs vote more similarly to MEPs from the same party group 
than to MEPs from the same member state. This is a remarkable finding given 
the diversity of national parties that make up each party group, and the 
enduring relevance of national parties in MEPs’ political careers.  
The second approach to the study of party cohesion in the EP has relied 
on survey data to examine the positions of party groups on broad ideological 
dimensions and issue domains. McElroy and Benoit examine the ideological 
cohesion of national parties in EP party groups based on expert judgements 
of those parties’ ideological positions (McElroy and Benoit 2010; 2012). 
Thomassen and Schmitt (1999; see also Thomassen et al. 2004) use data 
from surveys of MEPs to determine how cohesive and distinctive party groups 
are in relation to a set of broad policy questions. A key finding from this line of 
research is that EP party groups are cohesive in terms of their positions on 
the main general ideological dimensions that define modern politics, such as 
the general left-right dimension, the deregulation dimension and the social-
liberalism dimension.  
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Our approach departs from previous research both theoretically and 
empirically. Our theoretical expectations incorporate the competing pressures 
to which MEPs are subject from their national governments and fellow MEPs 
in the EU’s bicameral system. We consider how what goes on in the Council, 
where national governments are represented, affects the cohesion of party 
groups in the EP. Our empirical approach matches this theoretical concern by 
considering evidence on the policy positions of three types of actors on a 
range of specific controversial issues: first, each national delegation of MEPs 
from each of the three main party groups; second, each of the three main 
party groups; and, third, each national government in the Council. This allows 
us to examine the conditions under which national delegations of MEPs 
disagree with their EP party groups, and to draw inferences on the influence 
of MEPs’ national governments in this respect. Our data on actors’ policy 
positions on specific controversial issues is distinct from and complements 
existing studies based on roll-call voting and positions on general ideological 
dimensions. 
   
National divisions in EP party groups  
 
In the present study we conceive of party-group cohesion as agreement 
among the national delegations of MEPs within a transnational party group in 
terms of their policy positions on specific controversial issues. The dependent 
variable and unit of analysis in our study refers to the policy position of a 
national delegation of MEPs in a transnational party group in relation to a 
specific controversial issue. We examine the likelihood that each national 
delegation of MEPs takes a policy position that differs from that of their 
transnational party group. Specific issues are policy questions concerning 
aspects of a legislative proposal that involve choices between alternatives. 
The issues depend on the legislative proposal in question. For example, a 
proposed regulation to limit EU subsidies for sugar production raised the issue 
of the percentage by which the intervention price should be cut 
(CNS/2005/118). A proposed directive on data retention, which will be 
discussed in more detail below, raised the issue of the range of crimes that 
the retained data could be used to combat (COD/2005/182). Actors’ policy 
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positions on such specific issues refer to the policy alternatives they favour. 
Our focus is therefore distinct from that of previous studies that have 
examined party group cohesion: roll-call votes and positions on ideological 
dimensions. Roll-call votes might not detect national divisions if national 
delegations are coerced into voting in line with their party groups. Similarly, 
agreement on general ideological principles might not translate into 
agreement on specific issues when strong national interests are at stake. 
Given that studies of roll-call voting and ideological congruence have 
revealed a high degree of cohesion within EP party groups, it is worth 
recalling why national divisions are likely to remain relevant. On many 
occasions issues arise that are of great importance to national actors, such as 
interest groups, government ministries, or national parties. When this 
happens, MEPs may be subject to pressure from these national actors from 
their home member states to adopt positions that differ from their EP party 
groups’ positions. Pressure from MEPs’ home member states often occurs 
when legislative proposals raise issues on which clear national interests cross 
party political lines. For instance, the abovementioned proposal to cut 
subsidies for sugar production affected MEPs from sugar-processing states. 
Indeed, national governments attempt to influence their MEPs, regardless of 
those MEPs’ party affiliations. These attempts include regular high-level 
meetings with their MEPs and written briefings on current issues (Corbett et 
al. 2003: 280).  
MEPs have clear incentives to be receptive to pressure from their home 
member states, particularly when it is channelled through their national 
political parties. Most MEPs are elected in state-wide national constituencies 
and have strong electoral incentives to pursue the national interest where one 
exists. National parties control the selection of candidates for election to the 
EP, and provide campaign support. This means that MEPs depend on their 
national parties for re-election. Moreover, a substantial proportion of MEPs 
return to national politics after their service in the EP, where they again 
depend on the support of their national political parties. National parties’ 
influence on MEPs is also exerted partly through their residual role in 
organising EP business. For instance, while committee report allocation is 
controlled by party groups, once a group has secured a report through the 
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bidding process, national delegations within the groups have a say in 
determining which committee member gets the report (Kreppel 2002: 202-5; 
Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003).  
We argue that the main determinants of disagreement within EP party 
groups lies not in the EP, but in the Council, the main arena in which national 
interests are expressed. The likelihood that MEPs take a distinct position from 
their party group depends on the policy position favoured by their member 
state in the Council. Naturally, a member state government will not put 
pressure on MEPs to take a distinct position within their party group when the 
member state agrees with the position of the party group. Member state 
governments only have incentives to lobby their MEPs when the relevant 
party group adopt positions with which they disagree. We therefore examine 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: MEPs in a national delegation are more likely to disagree with their 
party group when their member state in the Council also disagrees with the 
party group. 
 
The first hypothesis concerns whether or not member states have an 
incentive to lobby their MEPs. Support for this hypothesis would be consistent 
with the argument that national governments influence MEP behaviour. 
However, it would also be consistent with the argument that MEPs simply 
have similar preferences to the governments of their member states. We 
therefore also consider the conditions under which national governments 
expend resources on lobbying MEPs given that their policy positions differ 
from those of the EP party group concerned.  
Governments’ incentives to influence their country’s MEPs depend on how 
important the issue is to the member state and on the distribution of policy 
positions within the Council. The level of salience that an actor attaches to an 
issue indicates the value it places on realizing the decision outcome it favours, 
as well as the disutility it receives from outcomes that deviate from those it 
favours (Bueno de Mesquita 1994: 79-82). Consequently, the salience of an 
issue to a member state’s government is reflected in the amount of effort it will 
invest in lobbying other actors, including its MEPs. We expect MEPs to 
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experience more national pressure on an issue if they are from member 
states that attach high levels of importance to that issue. These MEPs are 
therefore, other things being equal, more likely to take positions that differ 
from the positions of their transnational party groups. 
 
H2: MEPs in a national delegation are more likely to disagree with their 
party group when their member state in the Council attaches a higher level 
of salience to the issue. 
 
A related but distinct argument is that actors select the venue in which 
they concentrate their influence attempts based on their perceived likelihood 
of success. The Council is the main arena in which national interests are 
expressed, and any given member state will find itself more isolated on some 
issues than on others. A commonly cited norm of decision-making in the 
Council is that member states attempt to meet each other’s concerns, even 
when some of the member states in question form minorities that could be 
outvoted. This is often referred to as the culture of consensus (Heisenberg 
2005; Lewis 2008). Nonetheless, decision outcomes are generally 
compromises that are best reflected as weighted averages of member states’ 
policy positions (Achen 2006). This means that the more isolated a member 
state is on an issue, the more distant it generally is from the decision outcome 
if the issue is visualized as a policy scale. We expect that when a member 
state is more isolated in the Council, national interest groups, as well as the 
national government, will direct more attention to lobbying their national MEPs 
in the EP. 
 
H3: MEPs in a national delegation are more likely to disagree with their 
party group when their member state is more isolated in the Council. 
 
We also expect that MEPs from national parties that are in government are 
more likely to be influenced by pressure from their member state government 
than MEPs from national parties that are in opposition.1 A substantial amount 
of national lobbying of MEPs is conducted by national governments (Corbett 
et al. 2003: 280), and these national governments have direct lines to the 
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national parties whose support is crucial for MEPs’ careers. Therefore, while 
we expect that all MEPs are more likely to take a distinct position from their 
party group when the issue is salient to their member state government and 
when the member state government is isolated, we expect this to be 
particularly true for national delegations of MEPs who are affiliated with 
national parties in government. 
 
H4: The effects of national salience (H2) and national isolation in the 
Council (H3) are greater for MEPs who are affiliated with national parties 
that are in government. 
 
Research design 
 
A total of 16 legislative proposals, which were introduced between 2004 and 
2005 and decided under the consultation and codecision procedures, were 
selected for analysis. Only high-profile proposals that generated a degree of 
controversy were selected (evidence for this was based on coverage in the 
newspaper European Voice). Most of these proposals gave rise to several 
separate points of controversy; expert informants identified a total of 39 
controversial issues associated with these proposals.2 
For each proposal, informants close to the negotiations were interviewed. 
In total, 115 separate interviews were carried out: 60 interviews with officials 
from member states’ permanent representations; 40 interviews with 
informants from the EP; and 15 interviews with officials from the Commission. 
The individuals in the Commission were usually the officials responsible for 
drafting the legislative proposals and following the legislative process on 
behalf of the Commission. The officials from member states’ representations 
were desk officers responsible for representing their states in the Council 
discussions. Informants from the EP included the rapporteurs and shadow 
rapporteurs, their assistants, committee officials and party group officials. The 
interviews took place between July 2006 and October 2007, and lasted on 
average just over one hour. Where possible, the information gathered from 
the interviews was checked using documentary sources from the websites of 
the EU institutions.  
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The semi-structured interviews were part of an iterative data-collection 
process, in which a stylized depiction was gradually formulated of each 
controversy and the policy positions of the relevant actors. The estimates are 
not averages of expert opinions, but single judgements based on qualitative 
accounts. The first interviews in relation to each legislative proposal focused 
more heavily on identifying the controversial issues, which were then 
represented as one-dimensional issue scales on which the actors’ positions 
could be located. In order to facilitate comparison, we gave the extreme points 
on each issue the numeric values of 0 and 100, and the experts placed the 
various other alternatives discussed during the negotiations at specific points 
on the scale between these endpoints. Once the issue scales were specified, 
informants were asked to give their assessments of the policy alternative 
favoured by each relevant actor. Over the course of negotiations, actors may 
moderate their position in pursuit of an agreement. For this study, informants 
were asked about the initial positions of actors, when the proposal was first 
introduced. They were also asked to justify the information they provided. 
Interviewees based their judgements on the opinions and arguments put 
forward by these actors during the negotiations. Key informants were also 
asked to estimate the level of importance (salience) each member state 
attached to the issue, on a scale of 0-100.  
Informants from the EP provided estimates of the positions taken by the 
various EP party groups, along with the positions of national delegations 
within each of the three largest EP parties: the European Peoples Party 
(EPP); the Party of European Socialists (PES – since renamed as the 
Socialists and Democrats); and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe (ALDE). We focused on the three largest groups as it was not feasible 
to gather information on the positions of national groupings in the smaller 
groups. These three party groups accounted for over three-quarters of all 
MEPs during the period of study (the 6th parliamentary term, 2004-2009). This 
proportion fell slightly in the subsequent term, primarily due to the creation of 
a new party group, the European Conservatives and Reformists. 
Some national groupings within the same party group consist of more than 
one national party. For instance, the Swedish MEPs in the EPP came from 
both the Moderate Party and the Christian Democrats. However, the key 
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informants chose not to distinguish between different national parties, but 
rather identified the position of, for example, the Swedish grouping within the 
EPP. There are 67 national groupings in the dataset in total (25 from EPP, 23 
from PES and 19 from ALDE). Given the large number of EP national 
groupings under analysis, the expert informants were asked to recall a 
considerable amount of information. It is possible that the accuracy of the 
information varies depending on the size of the national grouping in question. 
We return to this issue below where we report on tests to determine whether 
or not this is the case.  
An issue from the Data Retention Directive (COD/2005/182) will be used to 
illustrate the data (Figure 1). This directive sought to harmonize states’ 
national laws regarding the retention of electronic data (from telephones, 
internet etc.), for use in law enforcement. One of the controversial issues from 
this directive concerned the types of crimes that authorities would be able to 
prosecute using this electronic information. Actors concerned primarily with 
civil liberties sought to limit the use of these data to the prosecution of very 
serious crimes (or not use these data at all), while those more concerned with 
law enforcement argued that it should be possible to use this information in 
relation to a broad range of serious crimes.  
Figure 1 shows the initial positions taken on this issue by political actors in 
the Council (shown above the line) and EP (below the line).  At one extreme, 
two left-wing party groups in the EP (the Greens and United European Left 
(GUE)) did not want data to be retained for law enforcement purposes, 
regardless of the crime. This is represented as Position 0 on the issue scale. 
At the other extreme, a large number of member state governments and some 
EP actors were in favour of using electronic information to prosecute all 
serious crimes. This is represented as Position 100. A number of intermediate 
positions were also taken: a small group of member states wanted this type of 
data to be used only in relation to terrorism and organised crime (Position 30 
on the issue scale); ALDE (along with some MEPs from the EPP) wanted it to 
apply to a relatively small list of specified crimes (Position 60); while PES 
were in favour of a slightly larger list of crimes (i.e. those covered by the 
European Arrest Warrant; Position 70). The political groups were not entirely 
cohesive, as some national groups of MEPs took distinct positions. Within the 
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EPP, delegates from Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands stood apart; 
in all three cases these MEPs moved towards the position of their home 
member state in the Council. Within ALDE, delegates from France and Italy 
disagreed with the position of the rest of their party group and supported the 
position of their home member states. 
 
<FIGURE 1> 
 
This example provides evidence in support of some of our hypotheses. In 
line with the first hypothesis, all five cases of disagreement within party 
groups on this issue occur in situations where there are differences between 
the relevant member state and party group’s positions. The group of six 
member states at Position 30 were relatively isolated in the Council, and we 
therefore expect them to place greater emphasis on lobbying ‘their’ MEPs 
(H3). In line with this, three of the five national delegations of MEPs who 
disagreed with their party groups are among MEPs from these member 
states. However, this case does not unequivocally support all of the 
hypotheses. Contrary to H2, the home member states of the MEPs that 
disagreed with their party group did not attach a higher level of salience to this 
issue compared to other member states (salience scores are omitted from 
Figure 1). 
  
Measurement and analysis 
 
The unit of analysis refers to each national delegation within each of the three 
main EP party groups in relation to each controversial issue. The 67 national 
groupings give a total number of 2,613 observations across the 39 
controversial issues. Not all of the relevant actors took positions on each 
issue. Excluding these cases leaves 2,143 observations available for analysis. 
The dependent variable ‘Disagreement’ is a dichotomous indicator of 
whether or not a national delegation of MEPs disagreed with their party 
group’s position. The distribution of this variable across the three party groups 
is shown in Table 1. The EPP group has the highest disagreement rate at 
19%, followed by ALDE at 16% and PES at 13%.  
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<TABLE 1> 
 
To what extent does this measure of disagreement, based on positional 
data, correspond to defection as observed in related roll-call votes? To 
investigate this, we examined the EP voting records in relation to these 39 
issues.3 Roll-call votes were recorded for the relevant EP amendments on 
only 18 of these issues. For these votes, we identified whether the plurality of 
MEPs in each national delegation voted in line with the position of their party 
group or against it. Table 2 compares this measure of voting defection with 
our measure of national group disagreement prior to the vote, and reveals a 
moderately strong relationship between them. Of the 188 cases where 
national delegations did not vote in line with their party group, the national 
delegations also took distinct policy positions from their party group in 108 
cases (57%). By comparison, of the 904 cases in which national delegations 
voted in line with their party group, the national delegations took distinct 
positions in only 89 cases (10%). Furthermore, the overall occurrence of 
voting defection and policy disagreement is similar: there are 188 instances of 
national delegations voting against their party group, and 197 instances of 
national delegations taking distinct policy positions from their party group. 
These figures therefore do not lend any support to the argument that roll-call 
data significantly overestimates the level of party group cohesion in the EP 
(Carrubba et al. 2006: 701).  
 
<TABLE 2> 
 
One set of cases in Table 2 requires further explanation. There are the 80 
instances where no disagreement was recorded between the national 
delegation of MEPs and party group, yet the roll-calls indicate that the national 
group went on to vote against the party group. While this may suggest some 
measurement error in the positional data, much of the discrepancy is 
explained by the fact the positional data relates to the initial positions taken by 
actors at the start of the negotiations, whereas the roll-call data refers to the 
final positions at the time of the vote. Occasionally, party groups change their 
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positions during the negotiations, and not all national delegations of MEPs 
agree with this. For instance, the PES group changed its position ahead of the 
vote on the issues relating to the Data Retention directive, and in doing so lost 
the support of some national delegations (see Ripoll Servent 2013: 977). 
Almost half of these 80 cases relate to this directive. When we exclude this 
directive from the analysis, the correlation between the positional data and 
roll-call data is noticeably stronger.  
The comparison with roll-call data also enables us to test whether there are 
biases in the positional data depending on the size of the national group. As 
mentioned, it is possible that expert informants were more accurate in their 
estimates of the positions of large delegations of MEPs. There are 67 groups 
included in the dataset, with a median size of five MEPs. We repeated the 
analysis above, this time splitting the sample into two: cases with more than 
five MEPs, and cases with five or fewer MEPs. The association between the 
positional data and the roll-call data is almost identical for these two groups. 
Turning to our hypotheses, we first examine whether national delegations 
of MEPs are more likely to disagree with their party group when the relevant 
member state adopts a different position from the party group. Table 3 
presents a cross tabulation of the variables ‘Disagreement’ and a 
dichotomous indicator of whether or not the home member state and party 
group took the same position. The relationship between the two variables is, 
as expected, very strong. Of the 469 cases where the relevant member state 
and party group agreed, the national group took a distinct position from the 
party group in only 13 instances (3%). In contrast, national delegations took 
distinct positions from their party group on 20% of cases in which the relevant 
member state and party group disagreed. In line with H1, MEPs are much 
more likely to stand apart from their party group when their member state 
government disagrees with the party group’s position. 
 
<TABLE 3> 
 
Hypotheses 2-4 are relevant only to those cases where the relevant party 
group in the EP and member state government in the Council adopt different 
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positions. The subsequent analyses therefore focuses on the 1,691 cases 
where this is the case. 
To test our other hypotheses, we constructed the following variables. The 
variable ‘Member state salience’ gives the salience score of the national 
group’s home member state on a scale of 0-100 (Hypothesis 2). ‘Member 
state isolation’ measures the absolute distance between the position of the 
national delegation’s home member state and the weighted average position 
of all member states4 (Hypothesis 3). Hypothesis 4 posits that the effects of 
member state salience and isolation depend on whether the national group is 
affiliated with a governing national party. ‘Government’ is a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether or not members of the national grouping were 
affiliated with national political parties that were in government at the time of 
the EP first reading. As mentioned above, occasionally a national grouping 
consists of more than one national party; if any of these parties was in 
government nationally then this variable was coded as 1; otherwise it is coded 
as 0. This variable is interacted with the variables ‘Member state salience’ and 
‘Member state isolation’ to test Hypothesis 4.  
We also include a number of control variables. The decision-making 
context in the EP may influence whether a national delegation responds to 
pressure from national sources. If a national delegation of MEPs is aware that 
there is overwhelming support for a particular position within the EP, then 
disagreeing openly with the party group may appear futile. In this situation, 
taking a distinct position would have no effect on the outcome, but would still 
entail reputational costs within their party group. The variable ‘EP unity’ 
records the size of the biggest coalition of MEPs on each issue (expressed as 
a percentage), excluding the MEPs referred to in the case. For example, if 
65% of all other MEPs (apart from those referred to in the case) take a 
particular position, then ‘EP unity’ has a value of 65. 
Certain types of issues may be associated with particularly high levels of 
lobbying of MEPs by national actors. For instance, issues that relate to the 
distribution of financial resources are likely to generate greater levels of 
attention domestically, and hence greater pressure on MEPs to pursue 
national interests. While there are an insufficient number of issues (39 in total) 
to examine such patterns thoroughly, it is important that we control for these 
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potential differences in the analysis. Two dummy variables (‘Financial subsidy 
issues’ and ‘Regulation issues’) are included in the analysis; the reference 
category consists of issues that focused on the level of harmonization 
required by the legislation and issues that did not fit into any of the other 
categories.  
Table 4 presents the results of two logistic regression analyses. Model 1 
examines the effect of member state salience (H2) and isolation (H3), while 
Model 2 examines the conditional hypothesis that these effects will be greater 
for government MEPs (H4). The data contain multiple observations for each 
issue, and these observations are not necessarily independent of one 
another. We therefore use robust standard errors clustered at the issue level. 
In addition, the data contains multiple observations on each national 
delegation. It is possible that certain national delegations are more or less 
prone to disagree with their party group for reasons not captured by our 
model, such as their ideological fit within the party group. We therefore also 
ran each model including fixed effects for national delegations, removing any 
systematic differences between them. However, the direction and significance 
of our variables of interest were not changed by the inclusion of fixed effects, 
so these results are not reported here.  
 
<TABLE 4> 
 
Turning first to Model 1, the variable ‘Member state salience’ is positive and 
significant. In line with H2, this implies that a national delegation of MEPs is 
more likely to disagree with its party group when its home member state 
considers the issue to be salient. The variable ‘Member state isolation’ is also 
positive and significant (in line with H3), indicating that a national delegation is 
more likely to disagree with its party group when its home state is isolated in 
the Council. The overall fit of the model is reasonably good, as indicated by 
the pseudo-R2 of 0.42 and the percentage of correct predictions generated by 
the model (89%, against a baseline of 79% for the null model with no 
predictors). 
Model 1 also reveals some noteworthy findings regarding the control 
variables. The negative and significant coefficient for the variable ‘EP unity’ 
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indicates that when other MEPs are more united in favour of a particular 
position, a national delegation is less likely to take a distinct position from their 
group. As we might expect, disagreement is more likely to occur on issues 
concerning the level of financial subsidies to be provided by the EU. This is 
broadly in line with evidence from roll-call data, which shows that EP party 
group cohesion is lowest on distributive policies such as agriculture. 
Disagreement is also more likely on issues concerning the level of regulation 
than on other issues.  
Turning to Model 2, we find only limited support for our conditional 
hypothesis regarding the government affiliations of national delegations of 
MEPs. The interaction variable ‘Salience X Government’ is positive and 
significant, implying that effect of member state salience is significantly higher 
for national delegations that are affiliated with national parties in government. 
However, there is no evidence that the effect of member state isolation is 
greater for national delegations affiliated with national parties that govern, as 
there is a non-significant coefficient for the variable Isolation X Government. 
Furthermore, the overall model fit does not improve with the introduction of 
these interaction variables5. 
A number of additional analyses were performed in relation to the results 
presented in Table 4. Firstly, the effects of some variables may differ 
depending on the size of the national delegations. For instance, a large 
national group of MEPs may be more likely to be lobbied by national actors 
than a small group. However, we found no support for this. The key 
independent variables in Model 1 (Member state salience and Member state 
isolation) were interacted with a variable measuring the number of MEPs in 
the national group6; but neither of these interactions was significant. Second, 
we introduced a control for the type of legislative procedure involved 
(codecision or consultation). As the vast majority of the issues included in the 
analysis (36 out of 39) fall under the codecision procedure, it is not possible to 
reliably compare the effects of the main independent variables under different 
legislative procedures here. Instead, the variable was introduced simply as a 
control, and did not alter the results.  
The coefficients in Table 4 indicate the direction and statistical significance 
of the independent variables, but provide little insight into the size of these 
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effects. Figure 2 plots the marginal effect of increases in both member state 
salience and member state isolation on the predicted probability of 
disagreement. The estimates are based on the coefficients in Model 1, with 
other variables in the model held constant. When an issue is of low salience 
to a national delegation’s member state and when the national government is 
not isolated in the Council, the likelihood that the national delegation 
disagrees with its party group is close to zero. When an issue is highly salient 
to a national delegation’s member state and when the national government is 
very isolated in the Council, the likelihood that the national delegation stands 
apart from its party group is much higher (a probability of over 0.40 when 
salience and isolation are both at their maximum values).  
 
<FIGURE 2> 
   
Conclusions 
 
We find high levels of cohesion in the three main party groups in the EP. The 
majority of national delegations of MEPs take the same policy positions as 
their party group, even when their home member states’ policy positions differ 
from their party groups’ positions. National delegations of MEPs take the 
same policy position as their EP party groups in 84% of our 2,143 
observations. This is relevant to the potential for democratic representation at 
the European level, since strong party group cohesion is necessary if 
European citizens are to exert meaningful control over EU policies via EP 
elections. 
This finding accords with previous research on party cohesion based on 
roll-call voting in the EP (e.g. Hix et al. 2007) and on ideological congruence 
(McElroy and Benoit 2010; 2012). However, the similarity in our research 
findings was not a foregone conclusion. The EP, like many other legislatures, 
records votes by roll call in only a minority of cases, which could lead to 
biased results (Carrubba et al. 2006). Since 2009 the EP has required that all 
final legislative votes are roll-call votes, but many votes on amendments are 
still not held by roll call. Parliamentary parties may call roll-call votes for 
reasons associated with party cohesion, to reveal division in other parties, or 
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to display or manufacture cohesion in their own party. Moreover, agreement 
among parliamentarians at the voting stage may conceal disagreement in 
earlier position taking, as is certainly the case for member states’ 
representatives in the Council of Ministers. Our findings suggest that research 
based on roll-call votes did not find high levels of party cohesion solely due to 
the peculiarities of roll-call voting. Our findings also support previous 
research, which shows that EP party groups are cohesive in terms of 
constituent national parties’ positions on general ideological dimensions. 
Ideological cohesion refers to agreement on general principles, and does not 
necessarily mean that parties are cohesive when it comes to specific 
controversies, particularly on controversies that raise national divisions in the 
Council. 
Notwithstanding the overall cohesion of EP party groups, our research 
highlights the importance of national divisions under certain circumstances. In 
this sense, our findings support the argument that territorial divisions can 
weaken party cohesion in federal systems, particularly when state 
governments are represented in the federal legislature. MEPs have loyalties 
not only to their transnational party groups and the parliament as a whole, but 
also to their home member states. When salient national interests are at 
stake, national groups of MEPs are significantly more likely to deviate from 
their party group’s policy position and come out in support of their member 
state’s position. 
The persistent relevance of national politics is unsurprising given the 
importance of national politics and parties in MEPs’ political careers. As long 
as EP elections are fought on national issues and national parties select and 
support candidates for EP elections, MEPs are bound to attend to their 
national constituencies. Nationality also still plays an important residual role in 
the management of EP business (Raunio 2000; Kreppel, 2002: 202-5; 
Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; Whitaker 2005), and national governments and 
domestic interest groups still attempt to influence ‘their’ MEPs (Corbett et al. 
2003: 280). Despite the importance of party cohesion for democratic 
performance, national disagreement within EP party groups is not particularly 
problematic for the EP’s popular legitimacy. This occurs only in a notable 
minority of cases. Moreover, most voters would probably approve of their 
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national MEPs taking a national line on issues to which their national 
governments place great importance, and on which there are limited 
opportunities to influence decision outcomes in the Council. 
We formulated and tested several theoretical expectations regarding 
disagreement between national delegations of MEPs and their party groups. 
Our hypotheses imply that disagreement occurs because of lobbying by 
national actors. An alternative explanation is that disagreement occurs 
because of congruence between the interests of national groups of MEPs and 
their member states’ representatives, without domestic actors’ influencing 
MEPs. This seems possible and could account for the evidence we find in 
support of some of our hypothesis. However, the finding that MEPs are more 
likely to disagree with their party group when their member state government 
is isolated in the Council implies that what happens inside the EP depends 
partly on what happens inside the Council.   
Most existing comparative research on the EP studies its politics in 
isolation. The same is true of most comparative research on the Council, 
which does not consider politics inside the EP at all. Integrating the analysis of 
decision-making in the Council and EP is hard to do, and most of the existing 
research approaches are of limited use. The problem lies in identifying a 
common political space to reflect the differences among the policy 
preferences of actors in the EP and Council. Comparing voting behaviour in 
the EP and Council seems like a dead end for the integrated analysis of this 
bicameral system. The Council still rarely holds formal votes, and when it 
does these refer to the legislative proposal as a whole, which are usually 
adopted with few dissenting member states. Research based on political 
parties’ positions on general ideological dimensions is also problematic. There 
is little evidence that national governments’ policy positions on specific issues 
are influenced by their partisan composition (Nugent 1999: 474; Heyes-
Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 250; Thomson 2011: chapter 3).  
Our research focused on a relatively small number of proposals that were 
negotiated prior to the Eurozone crisis that began in 2009. It is possible that 
national divisions have become more important in the intervening period, 
given the increased salience of the EU for national electorates (e.g. Braun 
and Tausendpfund 2014).  Future research should re-examine the influence 
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of national political actors on MEP behaviour in light of these changes. Future 
research should seek to identify specific controversies or policy dimensions 
that divide actors within both the Council and EP, as we have done here for a 
modest number of legislative proposals. This research approach might also 
be extended to incorporate other qualitative methods that examine the 
reasons MEPs themselves give for their behaviour. 
 
Notes  
 
1 For example, when the Irish government was faced with a challenging negotiation 
on legislation for new tobacco controls in 2013, the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and 
Health Minister sent letters to all Irish MEPs from their party urging them to support 
the government position (RTE 2013) 
2 This study was part of a larger study on decision-making in the EU (Thomson et al. 
2012). The larger study did not examine the positions of actors within the EP as we 
do here. 
3 We used the website www.votewatch.eu for this information. 
4 Weights are salience and voting power, measured using the Banzhaf index. This is 
the ‘compromise model’ which has been found to provide a relatively accurate 
approximation of decision outcomes in the Council (Achen, 2006).   
5 This non-finding may be due to the fact that national delegations in each of the 
party groups were treated as unitary actors. It is possible that a more fine-grained 
measure, which identified the positions of individual national parties, would find a 
stronger effect.   
6 We examined this using the absolute number of MEPs in each national group, and 
also using the number of MEPs in each as a percentage of the total number of MEPs 
from that member state.   
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Tables and Figures  
 
 
Figure 1. Positions of actors concerning the types of crimes that retained data can 
be used to prosecute (Data Retention directive, COD/2005/182).   
 
Notes: Positions of national groupings that take a different position from their EP political 
group shown in italics. 
Position 0: Leave to national legislation. 
Position 30: Terrorism and organized crime. 
Position 60: Shortlist of crimes. 
Position 70: Crimes covered by the European Arrest Warrant. 
Position 100: All serious crimes. 
AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CY: Cyprus; CZ: Czech Republic; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: 
Estonia; EL: Greece; ES: Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; 
LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; LV: Latvia; MT: Malta; NL: the Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: 
Portugal; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; UK: United Kingdom; ALDE: Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe; EPP: European People’s Party; GUE: United European 
Left; PES: Party of European Socialists; UEN: Union for a Europe of Nations. 
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Figure 2: Joint effect of member state salience and isolation  
 
Note: Solid line represents the probability of a national delegation of MEPs disagreeing with 
its party group as the values of member state salience and member state isolation increase 
from 0 to 100. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Based on coefficients from 
Table 4, Model 1. All other variables in the model are held constant at their mean value (for 
scale variables) or median value (for dichotomous variables). 
 
 
Table 1. Disagreement by party group 
 EPP PES ALDE Total 
National delegation’s position 
agrees with party group 
650 
(81%) 
651 
(87%) 
497 
(84%) 
1,798 
(84%) 
National delegation’s position 
disagrees with EP party group 
156 
(19%) 
96 
(13%) 
93 
(16%) 
345 
(16%) 
Total 806 
(100%) 
747 
(100%) 
590 
(100%) 
2,143 
(100%) 
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Table 2. Disagreement by voting defection (absolute numbers; percentages)  
 National delegation 
votes in line with 
party group 
National delegation 
votes against party 
group 
Total 
National delegation’s position 
agrees with party group 
815 
(91%) 
80 
(43%) 
895 
(82%) 
National delegation’s position 
disagrees with EP party group 
89 
(10%) 
108 
(57%) 
197 
(18%) 
Total   904 
(100%) 
188 
(100%) 
1,092 
(100%) 
Pearson Chi-square=238.51; p<0.00 
 
 
 
Table 3. Disagreement by agreement between home member state and EP party 
group (absolute numbers; percentages)   
 Home member 
state and party 
group agree 
Home member 
state and party 
group disagree 
Total 
National delegation’s position 
agrees with party group 
456 
(97%) 
1,342 
(80%) 
1,798 
(84%) 
National delegation’s position 
disagrees with EP party group 
13 
(3%) 
332 
(20%) 
345 
(16%) 
Total 469 
(100%) 
1,674 
(100%) 
2,143 
(100%) 
Pearson Chi-square=78.95; p<0.00 
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Table 4. Factors affecting the likelihood that national delegations of MEPs disagree 
with their party group  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b se p b se p 
Member state salience 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.12 
Member state isolation 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.10 
Government 0.04 0.12 0.71 -0.56 0.39 0.14 
EP unity -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 
Type of issue (reference 
category is harmonization 
and ‘other issues’) 
      
   Financial subsidy issues 2.53 0.72 0.00 2.54 0.01 0.00 
   Regulation issues 1.21 0.50 0.02 1.20 0.50 0.00 
Member state salience X 
Government 
   0.01 0.00 0.01 
Member state isolation X 
Government 
   -0.00 0.01 0.86 
Constant -0.81 1.39 0.56 -0.48 1.39 0.73 
Number of observations 1,691 1,691 
Number of clusters 39 39 
Model χ2 86.34 (p.<.00) 122.87 (p.<.00) 
Log pseudo- likelihood -503.60 -502.53 
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.42 0.42 
% cases correctly predicted 89.11 88.94 
Note: Logistic regression analysis; standard errors clustered at the issue level. Dependent 
variable is Disagreement. Only cases where the relevant member state and party group took 
different positions are included in the analysis. 
